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What is the DSM? Diagnostic manual, cultural icon, political 
battleground: an overview with suggestions for a critical research 
agenda. 
 
 
It may seem superfluous to begin an introduction to ‘the DSM’ by unpacking the 
acronym, as if the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the 
American Psychiatric Association did, indeed, need such introduction. As others have 
noted, well before its publication in May 2013 the fifth edition of the manual had 
already attracted enough analysis and commentary ‘to fill several journals several 
times over’ (Davies, 2013). It had also received unprecedented attention within 
mainstream media as well as a variety of patient- and consumer-led online platforms, 
leading commentators to describe the manual today as having the status of a ‘cultural 
icon’ (Frances, 2013, p. xii; Sadler, 2013, p. 21). A reference to ‘the DSM’ will be 
readily understood by readers and does not require spelling out – or does it? 
 
One reason to dwell on what ‘DSM’ stands for is precisely to note an incongruity 
between the fact of it being a diagnostic and statistical manual and its status as a 
cultural icon. That a medical classification system, a taxonomy, should feature at the 
centre of the discursive storm that has gathered around it in recent years is most 
unusual to say the least – a point noted by Davies among others. Although taxonomies 
are ubiquitous as part of the ‘information infrastructure’ that facilitates and orders 
social life, they are rarely conspicuous and almost never become an object of public 
debate.i This is not accidental. As Bowker and Star have remarked, good 
infrastructures tend to become taken for granted, naturalised, and thus invisible: ‘the 
easier they are to use, the harder they are to see’ (1999, p. 33). And, although the 
creation and maintenance of all classification systems involves considerable work, 
including the negotiation of conflict and compromise among multiple constituencies, 
such work itself tends to become invisible as the categories come to function as if 
they were simply given in nature. The cultural and political conspicuousness of the 
DSM – and of the conflicts surrounding it – is therefore part of what makes the 
manual remarkable if not unique among objects of its kind: indeed it is part of what 
needs to be addressed in any attempt to understand what the DSM ‘is’. 
 
Today the DSM is routinely described as the ‘Bible’ of American psychiatry, and as a 
text with global influence across the world. The biblical analogy is usually intended to 
convey the authoritativeness of the manual as a point of reference and orientation, but 
for the purposes of this introduction the analogy is perhaps more accurate in a 
different sense. Like the Bible, the DSM is not a single text: it exists in several 
versions (or editions), and some differences between these are conspicuous even to 
the untrained eye. DSM-I (1952) and DSM-II (1968) were flimsy ring-bound volumes 
of 130 and 134 pages respectively, while DSM-III (1980) was already a thick tome at 
494 pages, and DSM-5 is nearly double that size at 947.  The words ‘paradigmatic’ 
and ‘paradigm shift’ are also often used in connection with the DSM.  As a term 
whose connotations often sit ambiguously between the philosophical and the 
colloquial, this reference is worth examining in a little more detail. 
 
In a piece written for the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry in 2010 Professor Michael 
First, one of the architects of DSM-5 and editor of DSM-IV-TR, claims that revisions 
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of the DSM have ‘alternated between paradigm shifts … and incremental 
improvements’ (2010, p. 693). He identifies two distinct paradigm shifts associated 
with the DSM: one based on psychodynamic theories, coinciding with the first edition 
in 1952, and a different, symptom-based model coinciding with the third edition in 
1980. First then goes on to discuss the aspiration that the fifth edition of the manual 
would effect a further paradigm shift, towards a pathophysiologically-based 
classification system that would index mental disorders to specific genetic and/or 
neurological syndromes. This ambition for DSM-5 to produce a new paradigm shift 
has repeatedly been acknowledged in the course of the revision process leading up to 
the new edition (e.g. Kupfer, First & Regier, 2002; Regier, Narrow, Kuhl & Kupfer, 
2009), and as such is a matter of historical record. Eventually, however, it was revised 
to more modest goals and then altogether abandoned (Whooley & Horwitz, 2013). In 
the history of the DSM, DSM-5 must therefore be counted alongside DSM-III-R, 
DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR among the editions that effected incremental changes 
based on the model laid out by DSM-III, rather than a diagnostic revolution. The two 
main general changes introduced with this latest edition are the removal of the multi-
axial system of diagnosis designed to capture pathological factors along five different 
axes, in a move intended to facilitate compatibility with the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD); and the rearrangement of disorders into a different 
chapter order. Aside from these, changes have been introduced in the criteria and 
nomenclature for several disorders or classes of disorders, and the trend towards an 
increase in the number of diagnostic categories has continued – prompting renewed 
critiques of ‘psychiatric expansion’, to which I shall return below. 
 
If it is appropriate to describe DSM-5 in terms of a (failed) ambition towards 
paradigm shift, describing the first edition of the DSM as setting anything like a 
paradigm for psychiatry in 1952 is, however, presentist history: history written very 
much from the vantage point of today’s assumptions about the status and influence of 
the DSM. For contrast we may look at a piece written in 1959 for the Bulletin of the 
World Health Organisation, by the Vienna-born British psychiatrist Erwin Stengel. In 
this piece Stengel presented the results of a survey of psychiatric classification 
systems that were in use at the time in different parts of the world. The survey had 
been commissioned by WHO in response to ‘dissatisfaction about the chaotic state of 
psychiatric classification’ – dissatisfaction, Stengel later wrote, that had ‘become 
quite general recently and ha[d] been voiced by all schools of thought’ (Stengel, 1960, 
p. 123). The survey, which was not comprehensive, identified and described 58 
incommensurable classification systems, which Stengel divided into two broad 
categories: the ‘official, semi-official or national classifications’ and those used ‘only 
regionally or locally’ (Stengel, 1959). The systems were radically heterogeneous in 
terms of their organising assumptions, as Stengel’s description and analysis 
underlined: some classified psychopathology phenomenologically, others according to 
aetiology, or prognosis, or yet other criteria.  What Stengel’s piece highlighted, and 
what the WHO sought to start to remedy by commissioning a survey, was precisely 
the absence of a paradigm for psychiatric classification and for psychiatric thought. 
This was in 1959 – that is, 7 years after the first edition of the DSM had appeared in 
print. Not only did the DSM at this point not constitute a paradigmatic text in any 
sense of the term ‘paradigm’. As the survey found, and again in Stengel’s words, the 
manual had ‘so far failed to be adopted by the State of New York which, from the 
point of view of psychiatric statistics, is the most important state of the Union’ (1960, 
p. 123). 
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Why linger on the non-paradigmatic status of the first edition of the DSM? Why is it 
important to remember that ‘the DSM’ has not always been a text with the authority, 
the iconic status, and the paradigmatic pretensions that it has today? The concept of 
paradigm evokes the existence of a research consensus and the image of a ‘normal 
science’ (Kuhn, 1962), neither of which straightforwardly apply to psychiatry today, 
any more than they did in 1952 (Decker, 2013; Laugharne & Laugharne, 2002).  But 
my purpose here is not to problematise the use of this concept in relation to 
psychiatry; while epistemologically questionable, such use is not uncommon. If I have 
lingered on the non-paradigmatic status of DSM-I, it is in order to bring into sharper 
focus the specific character of the discontinuity between the first two editions of the 
manual and those that followed. This discontinuity does not lie simply in the fact that 
DSM-I and DSM-III reflect different models or ways of thinking about mental illness, 
which they undoubtedly do. More importantly, the discontinuity lies in the different 
performativity of these ways of thinking: the kinds of effects they make possible into 
the world; and the very different ecology of practices in which they partake and which 
they help to construct. Unlike the first two editions of the manual, DSM-III (1980) 
and successive editions did indeed come to function in a paradigmatic way, primarily 
but not only in the United States – they did become a ‘Bible’, an obligatory point of 
reference for a variety of constituencies, the centre of gravity of a network of 
relations, and as a consequence also a ‘perennial best seller’ (Frances, 2013, p. xii). It 
was a certain way of constructing mental illness, and what this construction made 
possible, that allowed for the spectacular success of DSM-III and the editions that 
followed.  
 
There are now a number of conceptually sophisticated historical and sociological 
analyses of the making of DSM-III and of the features that account for its pervasive 
organisational influence in the US as well as its global scientific and cultural 
prominence (see e.g. Decker, 2013; Sadler, 2013; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005; Horwitz, 
2002; Kirk & Hutchins, 1992). In what follows I will not attempt to summarise the 
detail of these narratives and arguments nor analyse their specific differences, but will 
rather develop a broad discussion informed by them. The discussion will build up to 
three keywords that I offer in the last section of the article, each with the aim of 
helping the reader recall a noteworthy aspect of the manual. The first keyword - 
polyvalence - captures the reasons for the DSM’s success and continuing prominence 
since the publication of its third edition in 1980, including reasons for the global reach 
of its influence even in regions where it is not adopted as a clinical diagnostic tool. 
The second keyword - ambivalence - is intended to convey that, while acknowledging 
the importance of the DSM, we should neither overestimate it nor take it at face value. 
The last keyword - participation - points to some features that mark the distinctiveness 
of the DSM-5 revision process and its reception with respect to its predecessors, and 
to the relevance and urgency of a social-scientific research agenda on participatory 
processes in the construction of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
DSM-III and beyond: a triumph of science over ideology? 
 
There is a mainstream narrative, one that has been part of the rhetorical strategies 
employed to market and promote DSM-III from the very beginning, according to 
which that edition of the manual represents the triumph of ‘science over ideology’ 
(Sabshin, 1990, p. 1272, cited in Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p. 250; Kirk & Hutchins, 
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1992). The first two editions of the DSM had been based on a psychodynamic 
approach, reflecting both the general dominance of psychoanalysis within US 
psychiatry at the time, and the views of leading representatives of the profession – 
particularly Adolf Meyer and Karl Menninger. We have noted previously that DSM-I 
and DSM-II were flimsy ring-bound volumes, described by Decker (2013, p. 321) as 
‘somewhere between thick pamphlets and dwarf-sized books’. Their comparative size 
relative to later editions reflects the comparatively small importance placed on 
diagnosis within a psychodynamic orientation to psychopathology. Indeed, The Vital 
Balance (1963) – an influential book that Menninger, a man whose name had ‘come 
to symbolize the psychiatric profession in its most vital, enlightened sense’ (Shabsin, 
1964, p. 475), considered to be his most important – included an entire chapter against 
‘the urge to classify’. Drawing a very explicit contrast between ‘dynamic’ psychiatry 
and ‘diagnostic’ psychiatry, Horwitz (2002) reminds us that within dynamic 
psychiatry symptoms are regarded as the surface manifestation of underlying 
psychodynamic processes forming unique patterns in the life of each individual. 
Symptoms are thus not interesting or meaningful in themselves, but must rather be 
interpreted in the context of an individual history before their psychopathological 
significance, as the expression of hidden conflicts that are biographically specific, can 
be established. It is these unresolved or poorly managed conflicts, rather than the 
symptoms as such, that constitute the ‘true’ disorder and thus the object of 
explanation and treatment. In so far as such unconscious processes can be accessed, 
this cannot be done through direct empirical observation, but by engaging in a 
complex, intersubjective hermeneutic process. This process will not only displace the 
importance attributed by the patient or their family to the overtly disturbing symptom; 
it might also reveal the (hitherto hidden or implicit) psychopathological significance 
of seemingly normal behaviours. Dynamic psychiatry tends to blur the line between 
the normal and the pathological, and the character of the illness only emerges 
gradually, through a process that is simultaneously also its treatment: it is small 
wonder therefore that such a psychiatry would have little use for a diagnostic manual, 
and that its diagnostic manual should therefore be correspondingly small. 
 
DSM-III embodied a very different approach not only to the classification of mental 
disorders but also to the understanding of their nature as pathological entities.  The 
approach is known as ‘neo-Kraepelinian’ with reference to its progenitor, the German 
psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926).  Following Kraepelin, the architects of 
DSM-III half a century later advocated a descriptive approach to mental illness that 
emphasised the importance of observation and deliberately eschewed aetiological 
speculation, leading to the often repeated claim that the manual, unlike its 
psychoanalytically informed precedessors, was ‘a-theoretical’.ii Within this approach, 
symptoms or rather patterns of symptoms became central to the task of classification 
and diagnosis. Unlike unconscious dynamics, symptom patterns could be observed, or 
at least elicited straightforwardly from self-reports; the categories defined on their 
basis could be tested in field trials for their reliability – or the extent to which they 
remain consistent when used by different professionals and over time – and tested 
against external criteria (or ‘external validators’) for their validity, or the extent to 
which they accurately and usefully describe a given pathology.iii In this sense the new 
DSM could claim indeed to be fact-based rather than theory-based. In other ways, 
however, this claim is very misleading. In its architecture and guiding principles the 
manual fosters what neo-Kraepelinians Compton & Guze (1995) refer to as ‘medical-
model psychiatry’, a psychiatry that implicitly privileges biological explanations, 
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without recognising that doing so constitutes a form of theoretical commitment. In 
Compton & Guze’s own candid words, ‘[t]he medical model is without a priory 
theory, but does consider brain mechanisms to be a priority’ (1995, p. 200).  Porter 
(2013) rightly notes that this seemingly contradictory statement makes sense in the 
context of an implicit and unreflective commitment to a certain (materialist) ontology. 
 
In the mainstream narrative that describes the success of DSM-III as a triumph of 
science over ideology – a classic modernist narrative of progress – the marginalisation 
of psychodynamic approaches within psychiatry needs no further explanation since it 
follows logically from the fact that psychoanalysis is not a science, and science (as 
bearer of truth and progress) is deemed ultimately destined to triumph. The vigorous 
espousal and promotion of this narrative already in the phase of production of DSM-
III (see Kirk & Hutchins, 1992) can be read as a rhetorical strategy of active 
organisational ‘forgetting’ through which a new organisational or professional 
identity may be forged (Bowker & Star, 1999). In particular it can be read as a 
strategy of clearance, which Bowker and Star define as ‘the erection of a barrier in 
the past at a certain point, so that no information or knowledge can leak through to the 
present’ (p. 257) or also as ‘a complete wiping away of the past of [psychiatric] theory 
in order to start with a clean slate’ (p. 258): the barrier in this case was rhetorically 
erected in the name of science, to authorise the wiping away of psychoanalytic theory 
from psychiatric classification. In this process, historical continuities were disavowed 
and as a consequence important analytical continuities have also become more 
difficult to discern. An example of this relates to the question of the progressive 
expansion of the remit of psychiatry. Today this is one of the main points of criticism 
of DSM diagnoses, whose proliferation with each new edition has been equated to a 
progressive ‘medicalisation of the human condition’ (e.g. Chodoff, 2002; Rapley, 
Moncrieff and Dillon, 2011).iv While it is true that expansion in terms of sheer 
numbers of diagnostic categories and subcategories became conspicuous only from 
DSM-III onwards, Horwitz (2002, p. 41) argues that this expansion has its roots in 
dynamic rather than diagnostic psychiatry: 
 
Dynamic psychiatry laid the foundations for the sprawling mass of troubling 
behaviors that diagnostic psychiatry would later formulate as distinct disease 
entities. … Mental health professionals became recognized cultural arbiters 
not only of serious mental disorders but also of personal problems, 
unhappiness, and deviant behavior. Diagnostic psychiatry did not invent 
therapeutic culture – it inherited that culture from its dynamic predecessor. 
 
Horwitz’s observation points therefore to a significant element of historical continuity 
between two otherwise heterogeneous psychiatric models. At the same time, however, 
it invites us to consider that the expansion of the remit of psychiatry has not been a 
linear process, always informed by the same underlying assumptions and with similar 
consequences. While diagnostic psychiatry may have inherited therapeutic culture 
from its predecessor, it also interpreted the nature and purpose of ‘therapy’ in a very 
different way. In the context of DSM-III and subsequent editions of the manual, 
diagnostic expansion literally constitutes a form of ‘medicalisation’ in so far as more 
and more aspects of everyday life (e.g. caffeine use or internet gaming, to name two 
recent additions to the DSM repertoire, in DSM-5) become susceptible to description 
as disease entities, and thus amenable at least in principle to pharmaceutical treatment. 
The critique of diagnostic expansion in this sense is closely coupled with a critique of 
	   7	  
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the production and maintenance of the 
manual (Cosgrove & Krimsky, 2009; Cosgrove, Bursztajn, Krimsky, Anaya 
&Walker, 2009). In the context of dynamic psychiatry, by contrast, the expansion of 
the remit of psychiatry followed from a blurring of the boundary between the normal 
and the pathological that was implicit in psychodynamic theory. In that context what 
was at stake was not so much a form of medicalisation as a form of secular morality 
centred on the value of the rational, individual self – a phenomenon equally 
susceptible to criticism but on very different grounds (Rieff, 1959; 1987 [1966]).  
 
To recognise the rhetoric of science in the making and promotion of DSM-III as a 
strategy of clearance – one successfully employed to trump and forget a prior order of 
psychiatric knowledge, relegating it firmly to the past of the discipline – does not 
imply a judgment on the quality of the science embodied in the manual. Proponents of 
alternative accounts of the success of DSM-III, however, have strongly argued against 
the notion that the manual was based on any new scientific knowledge (Mayes & 
Horwitz, 2005; see also Sadler, 2013; Whooley and Horwitz, 2013). As we shall see 
below, they offer explanations based on what the manual made possible at a variety of 
practical levels, for the profession of psychiatry and beyond. Before we come to 
consider these accounts it is worth dwelling just a moment longer on the status of the 
knowledge embodied in DSM-III and subsequent editions of the manual. Despite its 
claims to being a-theoretical, it is accurate to say that the new manual was borne out 
of a feat of theoretical and value re-orientation supported by the invention of a new 
process for the construction of diagnostic categories, one primarily designed to 
substantiate claims of reliability (Sadler, 2002a; Kirk and Hutchins, 1992; cf. Spitzer, 
2001). By contrast, the validation of diagnostic constructs that was part of the promise 
of DSM-III has to this day not occurred. This fact is not disputed; indeed it underlies 
the initial ambition of the DSM-5 Task Force to effect a new paradigm shift towards 
dimensionality (Kupfer, First & Regier, 2002), as well as the internal controversies 
and conflicts that proliferated around this ambition and ultimately ‘derailed’ it 
(Whooley & Horwitz, 2013).v The repeated failure to deliver on the promise of 
validation – whether through the paradigm inaugurated with DSM-III or a new one – 
has not been without consequence. At the very least, it has contributed towards 
creating a discursive environment where alternative approaches to mental illness 
cannot be so readily dismissed. While the DSM has never been without its critics, the 
latest edition has prompted at least two very high-profile organisations – the US 
National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) and the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) – to distance themselves from the manual, albeit for opposite reasons. While 
reservations expressed by the BPS centre, predictably, on the relative neglect of 
‘relationship and social factors’ in the genesis of mental distress (British 
Psychological Society, 2012), NIHM has launched a project for the development of an 
alternative set of research diagnostic criteria, unconstrained by DSM categories, to 
facilitate the creation of a new psychiatric nosology based on biomarkers and 
cognitive performance, reflecting an assumption that diagnostic validity should rest 
on properly scientific, ‘objective laboratory measure[s]’ (Insel, 2013). These are 
among many early signs that the dominance of the DSM over the classification of 
mental disorders may be on the wane. There are important reasons, however, why the 
curve of its demise as a ‘Bible’ may be very slow indeed. These reasons stem directly 
from those of the manual’s original success, and it is to these that I now turn. 
 
The DSM solution 
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Whatever the strictly scientific merits of DSM-III, the key to understanding its 
ascendancy to hegemonic status in the US lies in what the publication of the manual 
in 1980 achieved for a variety of constituencies with a stake in psychiatric diagnosis, 
and in particular for a profession that had experienced a profound crisis of legitimacy 
in the previous two decades. Others have richly described the multifaceted character 
of this crisis, and I will draw here particularly on Mayes and Horwitz’ account (2005) 
in giving a summary indication of the multiple challenges that US psychiatry faced 
during that period.vi These included a sustained intellectual critique of the very 
concept of mental illness from what has come to be known as the anti-psychiatry 
movement.vii The critique may be summarised by Thomas Szasz’s famous proposition 
that mental illness is a ‘myth’ and psychiatry an agency of social control for 
behaviour that is simply deviant or non-conformist (Szasz, 1961). The fierce 
controversy and debate over the status of ‘homosexuality’ as a pathological category – 
leading to its partial removal from DSM-II in 1973viii  – lent support to the notion that 
psychiatric diagnosis more generally was an arbitrary form of social and moral 
policing. Despite its intellectual character, the critique became very influential as part 
of a wider counter-cultural movement that saw anti-psychiatry side with other forms 
of political radicalism, deeply affecting the public image of psychiatry as a profession. 
At the same time, if psychiatry as an agent of moral and social control appeared 
politically questionable, in other ways the profession in its psychodynamic 
incarnation appeared desperately ineffective at dealing with the most serious cases of 
mental illness, particularly in the context of deinstitutionalisation.ix  
 
Another range of pressures stemmed from a different set of developments, namely the 
inclusion of mental health treatment – then chiefly psychotherapy – within medical 
insurance plans from the 1960s and from the following decade into the federal 
Medicaid programme. The diagnostic slackness of the psychodynamic model of 
mental illness did not marry well with these developments. Insurers and policymakers 
wanted to be able to quantify the expense associated with each type of illness and 
wanted to be able to justify that expense on the basis of demonstrated effectiveness. 
The psychodynamic model – by its very character – could offer neither. But insurers 
and policymakers were not alone in bemoaning this diagnostic slackness: research 
oriented psychiatrists keen to develop standards to measure the effectiveness of 
treatment were similarly frustrated by it.  Last but not least, Mayes and Horwitz 
(2005) point the emergence of competing ‘psy’ professions during the same period as 
posing a significant threat to the psychiatric profession. Psychiatrists were 
expensively trained physicians – but in their practice, they offered nothing more or 
different than what non-medical professionals trained in psychotherapy 
(psychologists, social workers, counsellors, clergy) could offer. Their monopoly over 
the treatment of mental illness became difficult to justify. This broad background 
contributed to a situation in the mid 1970s where US psychiatry, in the view of the 
then president of the APA, was on ‘the edge of extinction’ as a profession (Wilson, 
cited in Mayes and Horwitz, 2005, p. 256). The unreliability of diagnosis became, in 
this context, ‘symbolic of the profession’s self-doubts and of its vulnerability to 
public and scientific criticism’ (Kirk & Hutchings, 1992, p. 13). 
 
When the revision of DSM-II was commissioned in 1974, the expectation was not that 
this would produce a revolutionary change for the discipline. But the process of 
revision was used by those appointed to coordinate it to deliberately address many of 
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the challenges described above, by focusing specifically on the question of reliability. 
DSM-III and its symptom-based, categorical approach redefined mental illnesses as 
discrete entities with clearly defined criteria and boundaries. These criteria and 
boundaries made mental disorders quantifiable in terms of population statistics, and 
therefore costable; they also made psychiatrists accountable in diagnosing them. As 
discrete entities, these were disorders in relation to which pharmaceutical drugs could 
be specifically developed, tested, and marketed. The capacity to prescribe 
pharmaceuticals restored a measure of specific authority – a unique added value – to 
the medically trained, psychiatric profession in relation to other competing 
professions. As Mayes and Horwitz (2005, p. 258) eloquently put it, DSM-III 
‘realigned the incentives of a great many stakeholders’ – clinicians, insurers, the 
government, pharmaceutical companies and researchers. It did this by providing 
standardised definitions of psychiatric conditions, ones that would be recognisable, 
meaningful and usable across all these domains. In this sense, DSM-III can be 
described as a quintessential ‘boundary object’, one that has ‘different meanings in 
different social worlds but [whose] structure is common enough to more than one 
world to make [it] recognizable, a means of translation’ (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 
393). As a boundary object, the DSM functions at the centre of what has been 
described – with deliberate reference to Eisenhower’s cautionary trope of a ‘military 
industrial complex’ – as a Mental Health-Medical-Industrial-Complex or MHMIC 
(Sadler, 2013). 
 
Three keywords 
 
Polyvalence 
 
According to Sadler (2013), MHMIC comprises ten elements or ‘vectors’ interacting 
to contribute to the continuing dominance of the DSM, despite the extensive criticism 
and widely acknowledged shortcomings of the manual. These elements include (1) the 
existence of millions of mentally ill people as a captive market; (2) a powerful and 
competitive pharmaceutical industry; (3) a for-profit service industry of insurers and 
other funding sources of health care, linked to (4) the character of the US healthcare 
system as a for-profit business enterprise; (5) the character of US politics as 
dominated by the power and interests of corporate wealth; (6) the mass media 
promotion of medical products and particularly direct-to-consumer advertising, and a 
corresponding (7) popular demand for ‘passive, product-based therapies’ (p. 30); (8) 
the emphasis on neuroscience and psychopharmacology as research and funding 
priorities by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH); (9) the increasing 
reliance of clinical investigators within academic medical centres on ‘soft’ sources of 
funding, namely grants and contracts; and (10) the financial interest of the APA in the 
continuing dominance of its manual. 
 
If analyses in terms of the sociology of the professions are most helpful in 
understanding the conditions of possibility for a diagnostic ‘revolution’ in 1980 
(Mayes & Horwitz, 2103), an analysis in terms of the existence of a Mental Health-
Medical-Industrial-Complex is helpful in understanding the wider conditions of 
possibility for the hegemonic status of the DSM in the US and more widely. The 
DSM is a powerful object because it is a polyvalent object: it serves multiple 
functions in relation to multiple, but related, interests. In fact, as a boundary object, 
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the key to its success lies precisely in its ability to relate those interests, by mediating 
communication and interaction between them.  
 
Sadler’s MHMIC analysis is limited to the United States, although he explicitly 
invites studies that might extend it to other Western industrialised societies. Crucial to 
understanding the wider influence of the DSM outside the US, however, is that 
several of the vectors involved in the MHMIC operate transnationally on a global 
scale, the pharmaceutical industry being a prime example of this. The wider 
significance of the DSM is not adequately captured, therefore, by the extent to which 
the manual is formally adopted as a clinical tool by the health systems of other nation-
states, which may differ in important ways from the American one. In the context of 
modern globalisation, Drori and Meyer (2006) argue, scientific rationalisation or 
‘scientisation’ has come to function as the equivalent of a ‘natural “sovereign’” in the 
absence of strong legal or organizational ones’ (p. 31), creating both incentives and 
requirements for the expansion of rationalised organisational systems. Following this 
argument, to the extent that the DSM is internationally credited with having put 
psychiatric diagnosis on a scientific footing, it has by the same token become an 
important factor in implicitly shaping regulatory practices and organisational systems 
in the wider global environment. 
 
What I have called the polyvalence of the DSM is also crucial for understanding the 
reasons for its ‘conservative pragmatism’ (Sadler, 2013, p. 25), or its inherent 
resistance to significant change. If the multiple versions of the DSM since DSM-III 
are but ‘cogs in a much bigger economic machine’ (p. 33), then any prospects of 
change to the manual tend to be constrained by the phenomenal inertia of the machine 
taken as a whole. This background is what gives rise to the seeming paradox whereby 
the Task Force of DSM-5 were simultaneously able to explicitly acknowledge the 
inadequacy of the categorical model of DSM-III (Kupfer et al., 2002), and yet unable 
to revise this model in any significant ways – also (but not only) through fierce 
opposition from within the psychiatric profession itself, whose modes of work have 
come to rely on the institutional frameworks that previous editions of the manual have 
facilitated (Whooley & Horwitz, 2013). 
 
Ambivalence 
 
The DSM is indeed a powerful object, but social scientists and other commentators 
often make the mistake of taking its power at face value, overstating the importance 
of formal diagnosis and nomenclature at the expense of paying attention to how the 
manual is used in practice. Whooley (2010) is unusual in focusing on the latter 
dimension, and drawing attention to some unintended and unwelcome consequences 
of the manual’s success for psychiatrists’ everyday work. In particular he argues that 
the standardisation and codification achieved with DSM-III, while benefiting 
psychiatry by restoring scientific prestige to the profession, also opened the work of 
psychiatrists to unprecedented bureaucratisation and surveillance on the part of 
external actors (e.g. policymakers, insurance companies), eroding clinical autonomy 
and producing strong feelings of ambivalence towards the manual and towards the 
task of diagnosis itself. Following an agenda set by Bowker and Star (1999) for the 
study of classification systems and their use, Whooley then documents the multiple 
strategies that psychiatrists adopt in practice to work around the constraints imposed 
on them through the DSM, rather than using the manual as prescribed. Such 
	   11	  
‘workarounds’ include the use of alternative taxonomies (often a drastically reduced 
version of the DSM itself); fudging diagnostic codes and deliberately misdiagnosing 
or over-diagnosing in order to ‘pass muster with the insurers’ (2010, p. 460); and 
negotiating diagnoses with patients. While workarounds imply a critique of the 
biomedical model of mental illness (Whooley invites us to consider ‘how strange it 
would seem if a cardiologist negotiated a diagnosis over a patient’s heart condition’, 
2010, p. 463), his research suggests that in most cases they do not reflect a lack of 
faith on the part of psychiatrists in the promise of the model as such. 
 
A focus on the ambivalence of psychiatrists and on their tacit ways of resisting and 
subverting standardisation in clinical practice is valuable in tempering assumptions 
about the importance of the DSM based on its formal status as a reference manual. As 
a keyword, ambivalence suggests that the appropriate answer to the question as to 
whether the DSM is powerful cannot be a straightforward and unqualified ‘yes’. The 
DSM is indeed an extremely significant object, but it is difficult to evaluate it and 
discuss it in the abstract – since the realities of practice work with, around, and 
against the manual rather than simply in accordance with it. This is obviously even 
truer outside the US and in countries like the UK, where DSM categories are mostly 
used for research purposes and the clinical relevance of the manual is minimal or non-
existent. 
 
Participation 
 
Bowker and Star (1999, p. 319) conclude their seminal work on classification systems 
by saying that ‘classifications should be recognized as the significant site of political 
and ethical work that they are’ – which means effectively that ‘they should be 
reclassified’ within the Western cultural imagination, where they tend to be regarded 
as neutral representations of natural realities. As they acknowledge, however, the 
political dimension of the DSM has never been inconspicuous. Aside from political 
clamour over individual diagnostic categories, controversy and debate over the DSM 
qua system of classification have been part of its history since the build up to the third 
edition. In particular, the degree of publicity and critical commentary that has 
accompanied the revision process for DSM-5 and its eventual publication have been 
without precedent, no doubt thanks also to a mediatic landscape transformed by the 
emergence of digital technologies. While these facts are well known, less attention 
has been paid to the ways in which procedural (and political) norms of transparency, 
inclusiveness, collaboration, accountability and respect for diversity have been 
embedded in the production of the manual from DSM-III onwards, albeit in the name 
of ensuring scientificity and robustness rather than in the name of a democratization 
of the process. Virtually alone in attempting an analysis of this dimension of the DSM 
and its making, Sadler (2002a) and Sadler and Fulford (2004) have argued that a clear 
commitment to these values has been evident in efforts to make the process and its 
goals transparent through papers, books and meetings; to solicit input from scientists 
and clinicians beyond psychiatry (including, with DSM-IV, from stakeholder 
organisations); to form work groups designed to represent a variety of perspectives; 
and to circulate draft categories and criteria for feedback and comment. At the same 
time, Sadler (2002a) has illustrated that this commitment has always been partial and 
marked by profound ambivalence, with many aspects of the process remaining closed 
to scrutiny and input from outside. 
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In the years leading to the publication of DSM-5, the question of whether and how the 
DSM process should be made more democratically accountable has been raised 
explicitly (see e.g. Sadler, 2002a; Sadler & Fulford, 2004; Porter, 2013), as part of a 
broader discussion of the normativity of psychiatric diagnosis (Sadler, 2002b; 2004). 
While some dismissed the very idea of including patients and families in the revision 
process as ‘politically correct nonsense’ (Spitzer, 2004), one of the procedural 
innovations associated with DSM-5 was the provision of an online platform where 
progress on the revision process was regularly documented for the general public, and 
where members of the public were invited to acquaint themselves with the working 
groups responsible for revising particular categories of disorders. During three phases 
of open consultation staggered across three years, the APA solicited comments, 
questions and concerns from anyone interested in participating in the process, from 
professional societies to patients. 
 
Despite these developments, the ambivalence identified by Sadler (2002a) with 
reference to previous revision processes seemingly persists. On the one hand, some of 
the ‘closed’ aspects of the process remain closed – for example, the detail of how 
input from public consultations has been considered or implemented remains unclear. 
On the other hand it appears that the APA, while inviting participation through the 
channels it made available for this purpose, was not equally happy with participation 
occurring through channels over which it had less control. During the course of the 
revision process, prominent patient activists ran parallel websites, typically in blog 
form, closely monitoring and commenting progress of the DSM working groups, 
while assembling news, information and resources on other relevant or related themes 
(for example, on forthcoming revisions of the ICD-10). At least some of the feedback 
to the main APA site was mobilised and organised through the work of these activists 
and their blogs. In 2012, the Association threatened to sue Suzy Chapman – a patient 
activist, blogger and owner of a site then called dsm5watch – arguing that her use of  
‘dsm5’ as part of the blog title was an infringement of their trademark. There was no 
commercial motive in the Chapman’s use of the term, and such use was consistent 
with many legitimate precedents, but the threat was enough for Chapman to be 
intimidated into changing the name of the website, causing her to lose much of the 
visibility of her work on the web for a period of time. The APA threat against Suzy 
Chapman has been described as a SLAPP manoeuvre – a ‘strategic lawsuit against 
public participation’ – by critics who also highlight that other domains using a DSM5 
URL have not been similarly challenged by the APA (Heisel, 2012; Carroll, 2012). 
The manoeuvre backfired by prompting a flurry of support for Chapman from 
professionals and patients, most notably (though not surprisingly, given his well-
known stance against DSM-5) from DSM-IV editor Allen Frances. In one of several 
commentaries, Frances cites the event as evidence of a basic conflict between 
scientific and commercial interests within the APA that ‘can be cured only by creating 
a new institutional framework to supervise the future of DSM revisions’ (2012). 
 
The third and final keyword – participation – is offered here to convey both the object 
and the spirit of a social-scientific research agenda in relation to DSM-5 and 
psychiatric classification more generally. The APA’s much-publicised efforts to 
render the revision process for DSM-5 transparent and inclusive, on the one hand, and 
its threat of legal action against Suzy Chapman on the other, are part of the same 
world and two sides of the same coin. Taken together, they invite us to interrogate the 
significance and function of different practices of participation and dissent in relation 
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to the DSM revision process, ranging from those facilitated by the APA and formally 
embedded within the process itself through dedicated infrastructural channels, to 
those arising spontaneously from different publics and de facto governed or 
disciplined by other means. Here I can only indicate the broad direction such an 
analysis might take, by suggesting that such practices should be studied in relation to 
a wider context of forms of transnational (self-)governance that have emerged and 
intensified exponentially in the years since the publication of DSM-IV (Djelic & 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Higgins, 2006). From this perspective, institutionally 
facilitated participatory practices may be regarded as an element in a wider global 
proliferation of activities of monitoring, auditing and evaluating, that have the effect 
of shifting attention from the substantive quality of products and services, to quality 
as measured by the process through which products and services are created or 
delivered (Higgins, 2006; Power, 1997; Strathern, 2000). In this sense, to paraphrase 
Higgins (2006, p. 9) the invitation to participate and the creation of procedures for 
doing so might be read as a strategy of pre-emptive capture of dissent. The APA’s 
treatment of Suzy Chapman would seem at least prima facie to corroborate this 
reading. 
 
In light of the suggestions made so far, I propose that one of the key ways that social 
scientists might contribute to the future of psychiatric classification and of the DSM is 
precisely by offering a critical analysis of how participation itself has been ‘done’ in 
the context of the latest DSM revision process, and how it might be done in future. 
Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson (2006, p. 13) claim that there is evidence that ‘[r]rather 
than building trust … transparency may in fact undermine it further, leading to still 
more requests for auditing and monitoring’.x  If this is true, an analysis of whether and 
how existing mechanisms designed for transparency are involved in producing a 
‘distrust spiral’ towards experts and professionals seems especially pertinent and 
urgent in the field of health, and mental health in particular.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This article began by querying whether the DSM can be rightfully described as a 
paradigmatic object and went on to propose that it is more accurately described as a 
boundary object. The term paradigm allows for semantic slippage between a 
colloquial sense in which it may be used to mean ‘model’, and the philosophical sense 
in which Kuhn (1970) used it, implying scientific consensus on exemplars of good 
science. Consensus, as we have seen, has never been a feature of the DSM.  If the 
model that DSM-III inaugurated has endured for over three decades and seems 
remarkably tolerant of critique, this has not been through an absence of controversy, 
dissent and resistance, but on account of the multiple, powerful forces invested or 
implicated in its endurance. The forms and modalities of resistance over the years 
have been more or less explicit, ranging from street protest and academic debate to 
tacit avoidance through workarounds within day-to-day clinical practice. Sexuality 
and its ‘disorders’ have been a site of maximum and explicit politicisation from the 
beginning of this history, and the vehicle through which fundamental questions about 
the status and implications of psychiatric diagnosis more generally have been brought 
to the forefront of both scientific and public debate.  
 
In particular, the controversy around whether homosexuality should remain a 
psychiatric diagnosis – which was highly public in the early 1970s but continued less 
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visibly in debates around the categories of Sexual Orientation Disorder (DSM-II) and 
Ego-Dystonic Disorder (DSM-III) – became the occasion for acknowledging that 
pathological categories are social constructs based on socially- and culturally- 
informed value judgments as much as on scientific fact.  This is clearly evident in an 
article where Robert Spitzer, chair of the Task Force of DSM-III, summarises the 
reasoning that led to the inclusion of Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality in DSM-III, 
anticipating arguments leading to its removal in DSM-III-R (1987). In this piece, 
Spitzer (1981, p. 211) argues that the ‘specification of the reasons for identifying 
certain conditions as pathological’ should be a requirement for a discussion of the 
status of homosexuality as a mental disorder and, by extension, of ‘other conditions 
whose status as disorders is questionable’. After discussing the concepts of distress 
and impairment, he concludes emphatically that  
 
the question of whether or not heterosexual functioning should be used as the 
norm – so that inability to function heterosexually is impairment in a major area 
of functioning – is a value judgment and not a factual matter. It should be 
understood that there is always a value judgment in deciding that a particular 
area of functioning is ‘important’ (1981, p. 212).xi  
 
More recent debates in connection with expressions of gender variance and the 
DSM-IV category of Gender Identity Disorder, in anticipation of the category’s 
revision for DSM-5, have been compared to the controversy over homosexuality 
(Drescher, 2010). While there are many points of resemblance between the two 
controversies – including important parallels in arguments for diagnostic removal – 
the more recent debates complicate the picture, by illustrating that acceptance of 
gender variance and the promotion of civil rights for transgender persons is not 
invariably or necessarily predicated on the removal of the relevant diagnostic 
categories. As Drescher puts it (2010, p. 448) 
 
efforts to straddle the contradictory implications of having a diagnosis (bad, 
disordered) while putting forth a narrative of normal variation (good, natural) 
can be seen to foster an environment in which offering medical and surgical 
treatment does not imply stigma or judgment. 
 
These are questions whose relevance and implications clearly transcend the 
domains of gender and sexuality, but that the lens of gender and sexuality has 
helped to focus for more general discussion.  They illustrate that the work of 
debating diagnosis does not end with the recognition that diagnostic categories 
reflect ethical and political commitments, but rather only starts in earnest at that 
point.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i I follow Bowker & Star (1999) in describing classification systems as ‘information infrastructure’, a 
designation intended to convey classifications and standards as forms of technology: their production 
and maintenance involves a lot of (often invisible) work; and they in turn perform a lot of work by 
providing frameworks that allow whole networks to function. In this sense, ‘information 
infrastructures’ are not dissimilar from the material infrastructure of roads, water supply, electrical 
grids and so on. For a more detailed definition of ‘infrastructure’ in the sense employed here see 
Bowker & Star (1999, p. 35). 
ii See Decker (2013) and (2007) for a full discussion of the Kraepelinian legacy and its relationship to 
DSM-III. A special issue of the journal European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience 
(1995/4-5) is devoted to the discussion of Kraepelin and 20th-century psychiatry.  
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iii See Aboraya, France, Young, Curci & LePage (2005) for a discussion of the concept of validity and a 
review of types and phases of validity in psychiatric diagnosis. See Kirk & Hutchins (2002) for a 
detailed discussion of field trials and reliability in the context of the production and promotion of 
DSM-III. See Porter (2013) for a discussion of the construct of validity espoused in DSM-III and its 
origins in the work of Robins & Guze (1970).  
iv This critique has been formulated in relation to specific sentiments or conditions such as 
shyness/social phobia (Lane, 2008; Scott, 2006), sadness/depressive disorder (Horwitz &Wakefield, 
2007) and female sexual dysfunction (e.g. Moynihan, 2003; Tiefer, 2006); but also in more general 
terms in relation to the concept of the ‘normal’, most notably by the Chair of the Task Force for DSM-
IV Allan Frances (Frances, 2013).  These few references do not do justice to the extent of this 
prominent critique and should be read as indicative. 
v A ‘categorical’ approach to diagnosis, such as the one that has informed the DSM since DSM-III, 
measures particular conditions in terms of their presence or absence, implying clearly defined 
boundaries. By contrast, a ‘dimensional’ approach assumes that ‘there are dimensions of “functioning,” 
such as information processing, psychosis, affectivity, mood, and processing speed, that must be 
described and that different patterns among such measures reflect different psychiatric disorders’ 
(Harkavy-Friedman, 2009, p. 118). For critical appraisals of dimensional constructs in psychiatric 
diagnostic systems see the collection of articles stemming from the APA conference held on this topic 
in July 2006, and collected as special issue of the International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric 
Research  (2007, vol. 16, issue S1). vi	  See also Decker (2013) and Kirk & Hutchins (1992). vii	  I cannot do justice to the details and internal variety of this movement in the space of this article, but 
see Staub (2011) for a history and discussion. viii	  Homosexuality was replaced by the category of Sexual Orientation Disturbance in DSM-II and by 
Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality in DSM-III, both categories representing versions of ‘a compromise 
between the view that preferential homosexuality is invariably a sexual disorder and the view that it is 
merely a normal sexual variant’ (Spitzer, 1981, p. 210). Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality was definitively 
removed from DSM-III-R in 1987. For what remains the most comprehensive account of the 
controversy over the diagnosis of homosexuality and its deletion, see Bayer (1981). ix	  On deinstitutionalisation see Grob (1991). 9	  Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson (2006) draw for this argument on the work of Power (1997; 2003), Hood 
et al. (1999) and Moran (2002). 
10 Distress and impairment would become central to the diagnostic criterion of ‘clinical significance’ 
introduced with DSM-IV for many categories of disorder. See Spitzer (1999) for a critical discussion of 
the broader impact of this criterion on diagnostic validity. 
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